Pass → Koder migration runbook

Operational plan for retiring Koder Pass as a standalone product and folding its features into the Koder app, per id-app-RFC-001-stack-portal-consolidation.kmd Path B.

Scope

Timeline

The 90180 cadence is conservative. Owner can compress to 3060 if install base is small (no public analytics; owner has the number).

Per-side checklist

Pass-side (last release)

• [ ] One-time modal on app open: *"Pass is now part of Koder. Your

  data stays where you put it — to continue, open Koder."*

• [ ] Settings → Export to Koder button.
  • [ ] Asks user to type a transit key (fresh passphrase, vault-only)
  • [ ] Bundles vault data + metadata into a single file
  • [ ] Encrypts the bundle with a key derived from the transit key

    (Argon2id with new salt; same KDF that Koder will use to decrypt)

  • [ ] Saves to platform storage with a clear filename:

    koder-pass-export-<YYYY-MM-DD>.kpex

• [ ] D+90 read-only flag (Go server feature flag, single boolean):
  • [ ] All write endpoints return `409 Conflict {"error":

    "passreadonlymigrationwindow"}`

  • [ ] Reads continue normally
  • [ ] Modal copy switches to *"Pass is read-only since

    2026-08-18 — finish your migration to Koder."*

• [ ] D+180 store removal: pull from Play Store + App Store + the

  desktop release feed. Web download links 301 to koder.dev/migrate-from-pass.

Koder-side (this app)

• [x] Help page reachable at koder://help/migrate-from-pass

  (ships with id-app#009 — lib/sections/help/pass_migration_page.dart)

• [x] Vault section banner explains Pass absorption (ships with #006)
• [ ] Import flow in Vault → Import → "From Koder Pass"

  (ships with #006d): picks file + asks for transit key, decrypts on-device, re-encrypts under Koder vault key, persists

• [ ] First-launch prompt in Vault (post-#006): *"Coming from Koder

  Pass? Import your vault here."*

Cross-cutting

• [x] This runbook
• [ ] koder.dev/migrate-from-pass landing (cite this runbook, link

  to Help page deep link, show timeline)

• [ ] Forum / Slack announcement on D+0 ratification
• [ ] In-app announcement banner in the Pass app's home screen 2

  weeks before D+90

• [ ] In-app announcement banner 2 weeks before D+180

Encryption / key handoff

No silent migration of encryption material. The export file is encrypted under a transit key the user types in Pass. The user types the same transit key in Koder to decrypt. Properties:

• Transit key never leaves the user's head/notes — not stored by Pass,

  not transmitted, not in the export bundle's plaintext metadata.

• If the device is taken, the export file alone is insufficient: the

  attacker would need to either brute-force the Argon2id-derived key or coerce the transit key from the user.

• Different from "we'll just copy the vault key over" — that would be

  silent and would mean a stolen Pass DB grants Koder access too.

• Different from "user signs in fresh and re-enters every credential"

  — that loses metadata (last-used, notes, document scans).

Argon2id parameters (same on both sides — pinned in #006a engine surface decision):

• memory: 64 MiB
• iterations: 3
• parallelism: 4
• salt: 16 bytes random per export bundle (in the bundle header)
• output: 32 bytes (used as the symmetric key for XChaCha20-Poly1305

  vault bundle encryption)

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